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Overview
Information technology  has fostered the introduction and
growth of networks and related distributed systems,  in
which large numbers of agents (customers at home,
businesses, service provides, content distributors, etc.)  with
different strategic interests interact with each other.
Architectural considerations include:
   Computational requirements
   Communication requirements
   Simplicity
   Fairness and perceived fairness
   Stability
   Efficiency (resources used to  maximum value)
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Allocation of divisible goods
Allocation of divisible goods, such as rates on network routes:
Each link j has a capacity Cj > 0.
Set of admissible allocations:
Objective: Maximize social value:
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One solution:   Combine reduced complexity
optimization with Vickrey-Clark-Groves mechanism
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Strategic Pricing and Admission
SP
U1 U2 U3 Un
p
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1. SP announces a price vector  p = {pl } / 2. Users respond with a NE
3. SP maximizes revenue  / 4. Resulting p* determines admission of a
           user and amount of service (e.g. flow rate) admitted user gets
max  soc welfare(p)
x1(p*) = 0
not admitted
==> p*
. . . .
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What does this lead to?
 Economics of resource provisioning
With linear pricing
– Each user pays a price proportional to the bw it uses; adjusts its rate based on
price  and network congestion
– Network (SP) sets price per bandwidth to maximize revenue
– Each user has utility to flow and disutility to congestion and cost of bandwidth
usage
– As # users increases, SP's revenue/bw and users' performance increase, provided
that bandwidth increases
– Differentiated prices lead to “fairer” admission policy and allocation of bandwidth
With non-linear pricing
– SP achieves almost maximum revenue as though all users that pass an admission
test are fully cooperating (almost incentive controllable)
– Increase in revenue could be as high as 38% in high population regime, with
uniform user types. With diverse user types, it could be > 50%
– Users willing to pay more benefit from non-linear pricing, others suffer
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                   Combinatorial Auctions
Examples: Sale of  advertising space on  websites
                Sale of spectrum  licenses
                Sale of bandwidth on high speed links
                Transmission scheduling in mobile  wireless networks
                 Distributed, real-time scheduling of assets with deadlines
Goal: Design allocation mechanisms (rules of  the game) that lead
 to socially efficient allocation among strategic agents.
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Particular example: On-line resource reservation
Agents request reservations for groups of resources,
reporting deadlines and valuations.  
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Internet Model
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How to avoid costly price wars?
• Consider ISPs within the same hierarchy. If the ISPs
cooperate, they realize a profit; otherwise, there is a
price war which leads to zero profit.
• If the game is played repeatedly, is there a strategy
that leads to cooperation and is also a Nash
equilibrium for the repeated game?
• Strategy: Cooperate until a competitor deviates and
then play the single-step Nash equilibrium for ever
• Theorem: The above strategy is a sub-game perfect
Nash equilibrium and leads to full cooperation if the
number of users is sufficiently large.
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Implications
• small number of ISPs interested in a short term profit
or a large number which are all interested in long term
profits. They split the customer revenues amongst
themselves: coexistence in oligopoly.
– Example: DSL and Cable based providers
• some or all of a large number could be interested in
short term gains.  Set prices below others to make quick
profits.  Prices fall to the bare minimum (Nash reversion)
and all profits to go to zero: price war.
– Example: VoIP market.
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How can we explain volatile prices in markets?
How can we improve market behavior?
Equilibria in Dynamic Markets
Example:  Electric  Power
Price volatility did not
begin with the California
experiment, nor did it
end after the
resumption of regulation.
Dramatic price volatility
is seen all over the world
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Dynamics in the form of friction can cause
volatility
Dynamic Market Models
One cause of price  volatility is friction.  In the case of
electric power,  one example is the ramp constraint  on
generation.
More complex dynamics  may result in surprising
behavior, such as negative prices!
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Market efficiency is possible  in the presence of
price volatility.  But, is the outcome fair?
Equilibria in Dynamic Markets
In a dynamic market with
friction, prices  no longer
coincide with marginal cost
Conclusion from recent research:  For a market model with inelastic
demand, ramp constraints on production, there exists a unique
competitive equilibrium, and it is efficient.   Prices evolve with time,
and vary between zero and the choke up price
